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Book	Review:	Cameron:	The	Politics	of	Modernisation
and	Manipulation	by	Timothy	Heppell
In	Cameron:	The	Politics	of	Modernisation	and	Manipulation,	Timothy	Heppell	offers	a	new	analysis	of	David
Cameron’s	leadership	of	the	Conservative	party	(2005-16)	and	of	the	UK,	organised	around	the	key	themes	of
modernisation	and	manipulation.	In	his	admirably	objective	study,	drawing	on	compendious	reading	of	relevant
sources,	Heppell	demonstrates	that	while	Cameron’s	attempts	to	‘de-toxify’	his	party	are	important	to	his	legacy,	it
is	equally	profitable	to	regard	him	as	a	manipulator	of	the	broader	political	landscape,	writes	Mark	Garnett.	
Cameron:	The	Politics	of	Modernisation	and	Manipulation.	Timothy	Heppell.	Manchester	University	Press,
2019.
Find	this	book:	
On	the	eve	of	the	2019	general	election,	almost	the	only	certainty	was	that	the
outcome	of	the	contest	was	unlikely	to	generate	a	revival	of	David	Cameron’s
reputation.	Even	the	timing	of	the	poll,	which	ensured	that	2019’s	‘season	of	goodwill’
was	arguably	the	least	amicable	in	Britain’s	post-war	history,	could	be	attributed	to
Cameron,	since	his	Fixed-Term	Parliaments	Act	denied	Boris	Johnson	the	chance	of
choosing	an	election	date	which	would	be	less	vexatious	for	Christmas	shoppers.
Thus	few	Conservative	activists	are	likely	to	include	Timothy	Heppell’s	new	study	of
Cameron’s	leadership	of	his	party	and	his	country	in	their	letters	to	Santa.	However,
the	timing	of	its	publication	–	hard	on	the	heels	of	the	appearance	of	Cameron’s
memoir,	For	the	Record	–	should	have	encouraged	serious	students	of	contemporary
British	politics	to	send	a	request	for	both	books	to	Lapland.	It	would	be	a	rare	treat	in
any	season	to	read	and	compare	an	exercise	in	self-justification	with	the	careful
scholarly	analysis	that	Heppell	provides.
Heppell	organises	his	account	of	Cameron’s	leadership	(2005-16)	around	two	main	themes	–	‘modernisation’	and
‘manipulation’.	As	the	author	points	out,	Conservative	‘modernisation’	under	Cameron	has	been	analysed	by
several	scholars.	But	while	Cameron’s	attempt	to	‘de-toxify’	his	party	is	important,	it	is	at	least	equally	profitable	to
regard	him	as	a	manipulator	of	the	broader	political	landscape	–	both	before	and	after	he	became	prime	minister.
This	is	a	very	useful	corrective	to	the	previous	literature	on	Cameron.	Indeed,	one	might	even	wish	that	Heppell	had
pushed	it	further.	From	this	perspective,	it	could	appear	that	Cameron,	and	his	key	ally	George	Osborne,	were
preoccupied	with	the	‘modernisation’	of	their	party	between	the	former’s	rise	to	the	Conservative	leadership	in	2005
and	Gordon	Brown’s	fatal	hesitation	over	the	wisdom	of	calling	a	‘snap’	election	in	the	early	Autumn	of	2007.	From
that	point	until	the	election	actually	took	place	(May	2010),	Cameron	and	Osborne	sensed	(rightly)	that	it	would	be
easier	to	pursue	a	campaign	of	‘delegitimisation’	against	Labour	than	to	persevere	with	the	task	of	transforming
their	own	party.
The	sudden	switch	from	a	medium-term	project	of	‘detoxification’	to	immediate	electoral	battle-readiness
necessitated	headline-grabbing	genuflections	towards	right-wing	voters	–	most	notoriously,	Osborne’s	promise	of
Inheritance	Tax	‘reforms’	at	the	2007	Conservative	Party	conference	–	which	ran	the	risk	of	undoing	some	of	the
modernising	work.	Yet	it	was	a	risk	worth	taking,	since	Osborne	and	Cameron	had	sought	modernisation	not	for	its
own	sake,	but	as	the	inescapable	prelude	to	election	victory.	Now,	thanks	to	Brown’s	bungling,	it	suddenly	looked
as	if	their	ultimate	goal	could	be	secured	even	if	the	Conservatives	were	less	than	fully	refurbished.	This	is	not	to
say	that	modernisation	was	abandoned	completely,	but	rather	that	it	became	a	secondary	consideration	and	never
regained	Cameron’s	full	attention	even	after	the	election	scare	passed	away.
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Image	Credit:	David	Cameron,	speaking	at	the	opening	of	the	GAVI	Alliance	immunisations	pledging	conference,	13	June	2011	(Ben
Fisher/GAVI	Alliance,	courtesy	of	DFID	CC	BY	2.0)
On	this	view,	the	ill-fated	Brown	shares	responsibility	with	Cameron	for	our	current	discontents.	If	Brown	had
decided	to	call	a	general	election	for	October	2007	to	capitalise	on	his	honeymoon	period	(and	without	undertaking
his	much-criticised	visit	to	British	troops	in	Iraq),	it	is	likely	that	Labour	would	have	won,	but	with	a	reduced	majority,
which	would	have	encouraged	Conservatives	to	think	that	Cameron	should	be	given	another	chance.	This,	after	all,
would	have	been	a	fourth	successive	defeat	for	the	Conservatives	–	the	same	number	of	reverses	which	had	made
even	sincere	socialists	succumb	to	Tony	Blair	in	1994,	such	was	their	desire	to	regain	electoral	bragging	rights.
Cameron	would	have	drawn	the	(correct)	lesson	that	his	party	could	not	be	confident	of	victory	unless	he	gave	an
additional	push	to	modernisation	–	i.e.	he	would	have	been	forced	to	accept	that	tokenistic	gestures	involving
huskies	and	‘hoodies’	were	not	enough	to	make	Conservatives	seem	electable.	Given	their	innate	liking	for	tactical
gambits,	Cameron	and	Osborne	would	still	have	played	blame	games	over	public	spending	and	MPs’	expenses;	but
they	would	have	done	so	in	the	knowledge	that	Brown,	now	equipped	with	a	UK-wide	‘mandate’	of	sorts,	could	deny
them	a	chance	to	unseat	him	until	as	late	as	2012,	so	that	‘modernisation’	had	the	space	to	proceed	in	tandem	with
‘manipulation’.
Dealing	with	realities	rather	than	counter-factuals,	Heppell	shows	that	Cameron’s	manipulation	of	the	broader
political	debate	had	three	objectives:	making	Labour	seem	culpable	for	the	financial	crisis	which	erupted	almost	as
soon	as	Brown	had	decided	to	‘bottle’	the	snap	election;	staving	off	the	challenge	from	the	centre-left	by	endorsing
as	many	Liberal	Democrat	policies	as	his	party	would	allow	him	to	get	away	with;	and	heading	UKIP	off	at	the	pass
by	parading	Eurosceptic	credentials	which	he	had	borrowed	for	the	purposes	of	winning	his	party’s	leadership	in
2005.
For	Cameron,	after	the	2010	election	it	seemed	that	‘manipulation’	had	succeeded	in	a	way	which	could	make	the
incomplete	project	of	Conservative	‘modernisation’	seem	almost	irrelevant.	The	Liberal	Democrats	had	been
increasingly	sympathetic	towards	‘Conservative’	economic	principles	at	least	since	the	publication	of	The	Orange
Book	in	2004.	Cameron’s	‘modernisation’	was	essentially	an	attempt	to	move	the	Conservatives	closer	to	the
Liberal	Democrat	agenda	on	social	issues.	This	ideological	‘convergence’	remained	a	work	in	progress	in	2010,
since	many	Conservative	MPs	and	grassroots	members	retained	the	outlook	which	had	earned	them	the	reputation
of	‘the	nasty	party’.
LSE Review of Books: Book Review: Cameron: The Politics of Modernisation and Manipulation by Timothy Heppell Page 2 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2019-12-17
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2019/12/17/book-review-cameron-the-politics-of-modernisation-and-manipulation-by-timothy-heppell/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/
But	Liberal	Democratic	leader	Nick	Clegg	and	his	senior	colleagues	needed	no	convincing	that	Cameron	and
Osborne,	at	least,	shared	their	social	liberalism.	By	enlisting	the	Liberal	Democrats	into	his	coalition,	Cameron	had
thus	augmented	the	voting	strength	of	the	Conservative	‘modernisers’	in	the	House	of	Commons	to	the	tune	of	62
MPs.	One	might	even	say	that,	if	all	governments	are	essentially	‘coalitions’,	the	2010-15	coalition	was	less	like	a
coalition	than	any	government	since	the	days	of	Macmillan	and	Home.	For	Cameron,	the	parliamentary	arithmetic
of	the	2010	general	election	apparently	had	produced	a	miraculous	congruence	between	the	twin	aims	of
‘modernisation’	and	‘manipulation’:	hence,	perhaps,	the	unmistakable	aura	of	liberation	which	he	exuded	when
celebrating	the	agreement	with	Clegg	in	the	Downing	Street	garden.
In	a	sense,	however,	Cameron’s	‘manipulation’	strategy	turned	out	to	be	his	undoing.	Although	he	had	reached	an
ideological	concordat	with	the	Liberal	Democrats,	his	commitment	to	political	principle	was	never	strong	enough	to
overcome	his	tribal	allegiance	to	his	own	party.	Over	issues	like	tuition	fees	and	constitutional	reform,	he	was	either
happy	to	let	his	coalition	partners	incur	odium	or	to	exploit	their	weaknesses	in	order	to	thwart	their	reformist
proposals.	In	the	2015	general	election	the	Conservatives	duly	seized	27	seats	from	the	Liberal	Democrats.	If	the
party	had	exercised	more	mercy	towards	its	coalition	partner,	it	is	possible	that	the	Cameron-Clegg	show	could
have	been	kept	on	the	road,	resulting	(among	other	things)	in	a	compromise	around	the	2010	Conservative	policy
of	calling	a	referendum	on	any	future	EU	treaty	of	constitutional	significance,	or	perhaps	a	deal	which	gave
Cameron	time	to	call	an	‘in-out’	referendum	when	he	could	feel	more	confident	of	securing	the	positive	vote	that	he
desired.
As	it	was,	while	Cameron’s	‘manipulation’	proved	all	too	successful	on	his	‘left’	flank	–	saddling	Labour	with	the
blame	for	‘austerity’	and	ensuring	that	the	Liberal	Democrats	looked	like	Conservative	stooges	–	he	never	landed
an	effective	blow	against	the	hard	right,	within	and	outside	his	own	party.	Significantly,	in	2006	when	he	thought
that	he	was	just	beginning	the	arduous	process	of	taking	on	the	right,	Cameron	expressed	the	hope	that
Conservatives	would	‘stop	banging	on	about	Europe’,	but	also	took	the	risk	of	characterising	UKIP	members	as
mostly	‘fruitcakes’,	‘loonies’	and	‘closet	racists’.		Since	these	verbal	volleys	were	just	the	opening	shots	of	a
campaign	which	he	did	not	sustain,	they	left	Cameron’s	targets	insulted	and	seriously	annoyed,	but	uninjured.
Image	Credit:	Cropped	image	of	Boris	Johnson	and	David	Cameron	speaking	at	the	‘Special	Address’	section	of	the	World
Economic	Forum	Annual	Meeting	2012	(World	Economic	Forum	CC	BY	NC	SA	2.0)
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It	was	not	surprising,	then,	that	having	backed	away	from	his	looming	confrontation	with	the	right	over	Europe	after
2006,	Cameron	was	forced	in	January	2013	to	promise	an	in-out	referendum	on	EU	membership.	Significantly,	the
speech	which	announced	this	policy	shift	was	delivered	on	the	day	before	the	first	parliamentary	reading	of	the
Marriage	(Same	Sex	Couples)	Bill.	In	due	course,	this	legislation	would	expose	the	extent	of	Cameron’s	failure	to
modernise	his	party	–	or,	according	to	taste,	it	demonstrated	that	the	odds	against	a	truly	successful	modernisation
had	been	so	steep	that	the	whole	exercise	could	never	have	been	more	than	a	public	relations	stunt.	136	Tory	MPs
voted	against	the	second	reading	in	February	2013,	providing	opportunists	–	even	those	whom	he	counted	as	close
friends	–	to	base	their	calculations	of	succeeding	Cameron	on	the	existence	of	an	unreconcilable	element	within	the
party	which	would	be	only	too	glad	to	combine	their	distaste	for	social	liberalism	and	fanatical	loathing	of	the	EU
into	an	incendiary	anti-modernising	agenda.	Thus	the	arch-manipulator	found	himself	comprehensively	out-
manipulated	by	individuals	who	had	no	respect	even	for	the	(very)	elastic	boundaries	of	political	respectability	which
were	recognised	by	Cameron	and	Osborne.
Perhaps	the	best	defence	for	Cameron,	then,	is	that	he	was	over-confident	of	his	ability	to	build	a	‘post-Thatcherite’
movement	on	the	centre-right	to	match	and	mirror	Blair’s	New	Labour,	even	after	he	had	jettisoned	long-term
strategy	in	favour	of	tactical	manoeuvres.	Having	taken	control	of	his	party,	Blair	destroyed	his	political	career
through	maladroit	decisions;	Cameron	made	his	share	of	mistakes	(even,	in	the	case	of	Libya,	one	which	he	could
and	should	have	avoided	if	he	had	clearly	seen	where	his	political	role	model	had	gone	wrong),	but	given	the
incurable	truculence	of	his	party	he	could	never	have	been	more	than	a	plausible	frontman	for	the	same	old	act.
Amidst	the	unsightly	wreckage	there	are	some	landmark	reforms	which	could	not	have	been	achieved	without	him.
Even	so,	a	more	resolute	and	principled	politician	than	Cameron	could	surely	have	made	a	more	concerted	effort	to
make	his	party	into	a	‘hostile	environment’	for	extremists	on	a	variety	of	issues,	and	to	follow	up	on	his	attacks	on
UKIP	with	a	series	of	thoughtful	speeches	on	the	pros	and	cons	of	EU	membership,	rather	than	saving	up	that
material	for	the	fateful	Bloomberg	speech	of	January	2013	which	marked	his	capitulation	to	the	demand	of	alleged
‘fruitcakes’	and	‘loonies’	for	an	in-out	referendum.
Even	if	these	reflections	on	Cameron’s	political	career	are	not	set	out	explicitly	in	Heppell’s	study,	they	seem	to	be
implied.	Heppell	maintains	an	admirable	tone	of	objectivity	in	a	survey	which	demonstrates	compendious	reading	of
relevant	sources,	including	the	work	of	many	authors	who	have	written	since	Cameron’s	ignominious	departure
from	office.	Ironically,	Cameron’s	successor,	Theresa	May	–	who	had	given	her	fellow	Conservatives	the	bad	news
that	they	were	regarded	as	‘nasty’	–	seemed	to	think	that	the	process	of	‘modernisation’	had	succeeded	already,
and	based	her	progressive	and	disastrous	2017	manifesto	on	that	assumption.	Johnson,	by	contrast,	gives	the
impression	of	thinking	that	‘modernisation’	will	follow	inexorably	in	the	wake	of	successful	‘manipulation’	–
Cameron’s	original	schedule	in	reverse.	If	Johnson	really	does	end	up	as	the	leader	of	a	Conservative	Party	that
merits	the	‘One	Nation’	label,	Cameron	should	be	allotted	a	portion	of	the	credit.	However,	at	best	he	will	be
regarded	as	the	inadequate	instigator	of	the	modernising	process	rather	than	a	decisive	actor	–	the	‘heir	to
Kinnock’,	perhaps,	not	the	‘heir	to	Blair’.	In	other	respects,	even	the	manner	of	Cameron’s	departure	fell	short	of	the
standards	required	of	a	responsible	political	leader:	his	resignation	statement	was	more	a	vindication	of	the
decision	to	call	the	referendum	than	an	analysis	of	the	result,	and	he	did	more	than	anyone	else	to	create	the
misleading	impression	that	this	outcome	represented	an	unequivocal	instruction	to	politicians.	Thus,	if	British	voters
were	ever	asked	to	participate	in	a	referendum	on	Cameron’s	merits	as	a	prime	minister,	there	are	good	reasons	to
believe	the	negative	verdict	would	be	much	more	decisive	than	48:52.
Mark	Garnett	is	a	Senior	Lecturer	in	Politics	and	International	Relations	at	Lancaster	University.	He	has	written
numerous	books	and	articles	on	British	Politics,	and	is	currently	co-editing	The	Routledge	Handbook	of	British
Politics.
Note:	This	review	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	LSE	Review	of	Books	blog,	or	of	the
London	School	of	Economics.	
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